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Hopes are high that removing fossil fuel subsidies could help 
to mitigate climate change by discouraging inefficient energy 
consumption and levelling the playing field for renewable energy1–3. 
In September 2016, the G20 countries re-affirmed their 2009 
commitment (at the G20 Leaders’ Summit) to phase out fossil fuel 
subsidies4,5 and many national governments are using today’s low 
oil prices as an opportunity to do so6–9. In practical terms, this 
means abandoning policies that decrease the price of fossil fuels 
and electricity generated from fossil fuels to below normal market 
prices10,11. However, whether the removal of subsidies, even if 
implemented worldwide, would have a large impact on climate 
change mitigation has not been systematically explored. Here we 
show that removing fossil fuel subsidies would have an unexpectedly 
small impact on global energy demand and carbon dioxide emissions 
and would not increase renewable energy use by 2030. Subsidy 
removal would reduce the carbon price necessary to stabilize 
greenhouse gas concentration at 550 parts per million by only 2–12 
per cent under low oil prices. Removing subsidies in most regions 
would deliver smaller emission reductions than the Paris Agreement 
(2015) climate pledges and in some regions global subsidy removal 
may actually lead to an increase in emissions, owing to either coal 
replacing subsidized oil and natural gas or natural-gas use shifting 
from subsidizing, energy-exporting regions to non-subsidizing, 
importing regions. Our results show that subsidy removal would 
result in the largest CO2 emission reductions in high-income 
oil- and gas-exporting regions, where the reductions would exceed 
the climate pledges of these regions and where subsidy removal 
would affect fewer people living below the poverty line than in lower-
income regions.
Fossil fuel subsidies amounted to about $330 billion (referring to 
the US dollar in 2005, throughout) worldwide in 2015 after having 
reached about $570 billion in 2013. This fall in subsidies could be partly 
a sign of reform or simply a reflection of today’s lower oil prices, given 
that historically subsidies have followed the oil price11 (Supplementary 
Fig. 1). It is therefore too early to say whether subsidies will continue to 
fall, stabilize or increase if oil prices rise again. Earlier work found that 
global subsidy removal by 2020 would reduce greenhouse gas  emissions 
by 5% (ref. 12) to 6% (ref. 13) by 2035 and by 6% (ref. 12) to 8% 
(refs 14, 15) by 2050. However, all of these studies were done using a 
single model and none of them explored variations in the oil price, 
which greatly affects the size of subsidies.
We used five Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) to evaluate 
the global and regional effects of removing fossil fuel subsidies on 
 emissions, the energy mix and energy demand under both low and high 
oil prices. In the high-oil-price scenarios, oil prices exceed $100 per 
barrel and in the low-oil-price scenarios they drop below $60 per barrel by 
2020 (Fig. 1).
The IAMs we use vary in their modelling approaches and solution 
mechanisms (Supplementary Table 1, Supplementary Information 
 sections 1, 2), which improves the robustness of the results in the face of 
structural model uncertainties. They include four technology- detailed 
energy-economy models and one multi-sectoral  computable general 
equilibrium model. An important difference across  models, which 
affects the modelled effects of subsidy removal, is the  responsiveness of 
energy supply and demand to changes in energy prices (Supplementary 
Tables 1, 2, Supplementary Information sections 2, 3).
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Figure 1 | Modelled high- and low-oil-price scenarios. Historical prices 
represent crude oil prices from ref. 28 and are shown through to the end of 
2015. Modelled prices start in 2020.
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We follow the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) definition of fossil fuel subsidies as government support 
of the consumption or production of oil, gas or coal that lowers 
their prices below normal market prices (Methods). This definition 
excludes un-priced environmental and social externalities such as 
air pollution and related health effects, which are included in some 
other estimations16 but are not appropriate for the purpose of this 
paper (Methods). We compiled a global comprehensive dataset of 
fossil fuel subsidies8,10,11,17,18 under both high and low oil prices 
(Supplementary Tables 3, 4, Supplementary Information sections 4, 5). 
In 2013, when oil prices were relatively high, subsidies amounted 
to approximately $570 billion (Supplementary Table 5), including 
$340 billion for oil, $110 billion each for natural gas and electri-
city, and $5 billion for coal (Fig. 2). Only $22 billion (less than 4%) 
were production subsidies (Supplementary Table 3). Following the 
decline in oil prices, subsidies fell to about $330 billion in 2015, 
which amounted to about 10% of energy-related market transactions 
(Supplementary Table 6).
In our scenarios, we model subsidy rates in a way consistent with 
historical patterns (Methods). Under high oil prices, by 2030, global 
subsidies would grow to between $750 and $970 billion; under low oil 
prices, subsidies would be between $550 and $700 billion through to the 
end of 2030 (Supplementary Table 5). In the subsidy removal scenarios, 
their phase-out starts in 2020 and is completed by 2030.
The three oil- and gas-exporting regions, the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA), Russia+ (the ‘+’ superscript is used to refer 
to regions that constitute more than only the named country— 
see Supplementary Table 9 for region definitions) and Latin 
America accounted for about two-thirds of all fossil fuel subsi-
dies worldwide in 2015 (Fig. 2). In Latin America and MENA, 
about half of total subsidies goes to oil. In Russia+, about half of 
total subsidies goes to natural gas and the remainder to electricity 
(mostly generated from natural gas). Of these three regions, subsidy 
expenditures would grow the most in MENA, which would experience 
the largest growth in energy use (Fig. 2).
Developing and emerging economies (India+, Rest of Asia, Africa 
and China+) currently have lower subsidies than the oil and gas 
Figure 2 | Current and projected fossil fuel subsidies without reform.  
a, Global subsidies in 2013 (high oil prices), in 2015 (low oil prices),  
and in 2030 under high and low oil prices projected in different models.  
b, The regional distribution of subsidies in 2015 (see also Supplementary  
Table 5). c, Subsidies in 2013 and 2015 (Supplementary Table 5) and in 
2030 under high and low oil prices in each region (model median).  
For model ranges and additional years see Supplementary Tables 5, 7  
and 8. The map presents a stylistic representation of regions.  
For regional definitions see Supplementary Tables 9–14.
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 exporters, but their subsidies may grow faster in the future (Fig. 2). 
Without reform, subsidies in India under high oil prices could become 
comparable to those in Latin America and Russia+ by 2030. In these 
regions, over half of all subsidies goes to oil, for example, through 
depressed road fuel prices (in countries in the Rest of Asia region), 
tax breaks on road fuels (in China), or kerosene subsidies (in India 
and Africa).
Subsidies in the developed regions (Europe, North America and the 
Pacific OECD) accounted for about 13% of subsidies worldwide in 
2015. These are not projected to grow very much in the future.
Subsidy removal would lead to a small decrease in global CO2 
 emissions: 0.5–2 gigatons of carbon dioxide (Gt CO2) or 1%–4% 
by 2030 under both low (Fig. 3, Supplementary Fig. 5) and high 
(Supplementary Figs 5, 6) oil prices. This is much less than the 
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) from the Paris 
Agreement, which add up to a decrease of between 4–8 Gt from fossil 
fuels and industry. Subsidy removal would reduce the average global 
carbon price in 2020–2050 that would be required to achieve modest 
climate goals (an atmospheric concentration target of 550 parts per 
million CO2 equivalent by 2100 or a probable 2–2.3 °C temperature 
increase in 210019) by an average of 2%–12% or by $0.7–$2.1 per ton 
of CO2 under low oil prices (Supplementary Information section 6, 
Supplementary Tables 16, 17).
Even though the oil price has an impact on the absolute level of 
subsidies, it does not greatly affect the impact of subsidy removal on 
 emissions because the latter depends on the ratio between subsidies and 
energy prices, which is similar in the low- and high-oil-price scenarios. 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the low-oil-price scenarios; the high-oil-price 
scenarios are illustrated in Supplementary Information and described 
in the text wherever they are very different.
The impacts of subsidy removal are very different in two groups of 
regions. In oil- and gas-exporting regions (MENA, Russia+ and Latin 
America), subsidy removal leads to the largest emission reductions, 
equivalent to or greater than their relatively modest NDCs. In all other 
regions, emission reductions from subsidy removal are generally less 
than their NDCs (Fig. 3, Supplementary Fig. 6).
In Russia+, where most subsidies are for natural gas (including 
electricity generation), subsidy removal would reduce the use of 
natural gas and generally lead to higher emission reductions than the 
modest NDCs. In MENA and Latin America, subsidy removal would 
decrease the use of oil and natural gas leading to emission reductions 
that are generally comparable to the so-called ‘conditional’ NDCs 
(that is, commitments dependent on international action) but gener-
ally larger than the unconditional NDCs.
Developing and emerging economies that are not major oil and 
gas exporters would generally experience smaller emission impacts 
Figure 3 | Global and regional impact of subsidy removal and NDCs 
on CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industry under low oil prices. 
a, The impact of subsidy removal on global annual emissions compared 
to each model’s baseline. b, The impact of subsidy removal on cumulative 
change in emissions from 2020 to 2030 at the regional level (coloured  
bars). Solid lines represent emission effects of unconditional NDCs and 
dashed lines of conditional NDCs—both modelled in MESSAGE29.  
The uncertainty ranges for these effects arise from different historical 
emission inventories, alternative accounting, attribution of non-
commercial biomass and uncertainties in the formulations of NDCs 
(Supplementary Methods, Supplementary Table 15; ref. 29). See 
Supplementary Fig. 6 for high-oil-price scenarios and Supplementary  
Fig. 5 for global relative changes and regional absolute changes.
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removal in 2030 in four regions under low oil prices. MENA and Russia+ 
illustrate exporting regions, India+ illustrates developing importing 
regions, Europe illustrates developed regions (Supplementary Fig. 10  
shows the other six regions). Positive values of ‘Net change’ indicate a 
decrease in the total primary energy supply; negative values indicate an 
increase. Supplementary Figs 11 and 12 show results under high oil prices. 
The regional definitions (Supplementary Tables 9–14) can influence the 
size of energy system changes.
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(both in absolute terms and in relation to their NDCs) from subsidy 
removal owing to their lower subsidy levels. The main effect of subsidy 
removal in India+ would be reduced use of oil and natural gas, and in 
the Rest of Asia would be slightly reduced use of coal and oil. In both 
regions, the decline in emissions would be generally smaller than the 
NDCs. In China+ subsidies are lower and the impact of their removal 
would also be small in comparison with the NDCs. In Africa, subsidy 
removal would also have a much smaller effect than the NDCs (and in 
one model would even lead to an increase in emissions owing to the 
substitution of oil for coal).
In the three developed regions (Europe, North America and the 
Pacific OECD) with low subsidies, the main impact of global  subsidy 
removal is driven by the change of the price of fossil fuels on the global 
market. As oil and gas exporters reduce domestic demand by removing 
subsidies, they make more resources available for the global market. 
This can, for example, lead to increased use of natural gas in Europe 
(Fig. 4). This effect is more pronounced in models with more flexible 
energy trade. The resulting change in emissions can either be  negative 
or positive depending on whether the cheaper natural gas substi-
tutes oil and coal or leads to an increase of consumption. All in all, 
subsidy removal would lead to much smaller emission reductions than 
the NDCs.
Although the above results are robust for all models, there are  certain 
variations, due to different features and assumptions of  particular 
models. The most notable difference is that in some regions, subsidy 
removal can unexpectedly lead to an increase in emissions. In India+ 
(the MESSAGE model) and Africa (the REMIND model) this occurs 
because these models assume more flexibility in fuel substitution. 
As a result, removing subsidies leads to substitution of oil or natural 
gas with more carbon-intensive coal, producing either an increase in 
emissions or smaller reductions of emissions. In addition, REMIND 
assumes the most flexible international energy trade, which means 
that energy-importing regions (Europe, the Pacific OECD and North 
America) increase use of natural gas (and therefore greenhouse gas 
emissions; Fig. 3) after it stops being subsidized in energy-exporting 
regions. Other less notable differences are discussed in Supplementary 
Information section 2.
Our results show that removing fossil fuel subsidies would lower 
global energy demand. The decrease in energy demand is caused by 
increasing energy prices and ranges between 5 EJ and 26 EJ per year or 
1%–4% in 2030 (Supplementary Figs 7, 8). Under high oil prices, the 
decrease in demand is larger, reaching up to 30 EJ per year or 7% in 
2030 (Supplementary Figs 7, 8). The decrease in demand is largest in 
oil- and gas-exporting regions (MENA, Russia+ and Latin America), 
whereas in some energy-importing regions energy use could even 
increase following subsidy removal owing to the larger availability of 
natural gas on international markets (as discussed above).
In addition, removing fossil fuel subsidies would not strongly 
stimulate the growth of renewable energy by 2030 (Fig. 4). In gen-
eral, removing fossil fuel subsidies leads to an increase in the share of 
renewables in regional energy mixes of less than two percentage points 
(Supplementary Fig. 13). A slightly larger increase may occur under 
high oil prices in bioenergy in Russia+, MENA and Latin America 
or solar energy in MENA and Russia+ (Supplementary Figs 10–12). 
Beyond 2030, subsidy removal could stimulate more noticeable growth 
of renewable energy, in particular bioenergy under certain modelling 
assumptions.
A more pronounced effect of fossil subsidy removal is the switch 
from one fossil fuel to another, for example from subsidized  natural 
gas and oil to coal in MENA, Russia+ and India+ as well as from coal 
and oil to natural gas in Europe (Fig. 4), which highlights the need to 
consider the systemic effects of subsidy reform policies. The switch 
between fossil fuels is more pronounced in models with higher 
 flexibility of supply and lower flexibility of demand as well as higher 
flexibility of international trade (Supplementary Information section 2). 
Another, more granular effect is the slowdown of the switch from solid 
fuels (such as coal and firewood) to natural gas and kerosene among 
the poor, as shown by IMAGE (a model representing different income 
groups; see Supplementary Fig. 9). This is in line with earlier findings 
that as modern fuels become more expensive, lower-income groups are 
unable to avoid traditional fuels, unless supportive policies are imple-
mented in parallel20,21.
We tested the sensitivity of our findings against baseline assumptions 
(Supplementary Information section 7, Supplementary Figs 14–17), 
decoupling of the oil and gas prices (Supplementary Information 
section 8, Supplementary Figs 18–21), and the assumption of higher 
production subsidies22,23 (Supplementary Information section 9, 
Supplementary Table 18, Supplementary Figs 22–25). The emissions 
and energy systems impacts are generally robust across these uncer-
tainties but changing socio-economic baseline assumptions changes 
the projected emission reductions from some regional NDCs, which 
in turn changes the relationship between the NDCs and the effects of 
subsidy removal (Supplementary Information section 7).
Our finding that subsidy removal would have the largest impact 
on CO2 emissions in Russia+, MENA and Latin America is especially 
meaningful when we consider two features of the political economy 
of subsidies. The first is that subsidy removal could disproportion-
ately harm the poor in some countries24,25. The second is that today’s 
low oil prices pressure energy-exporting states to reduce spending as 
government revenues shrink24. This provides a unique political oppor-
tunity to remove subsidies precisely where it would have the largest 
effect on emissions and affect a comparatively small number of people 
living below $3.10 per day (Supplementary Table 19, Supplementary 
Information section 10). Conversely, in low-income regions, subsidy 
removal would lead to smaller emission reductions and probably 
affect more people living below the poverty line. The frequently voiced 
 suggestion of coupling subsidy removal with other emission-reduction 
policies such as carbon pricing12,15 or clean energy support schemes26,27 
would not necessarily reduce the impact of subsidy removal on the poor 
unless such policies are specifically designed to do so.
Data Availability All data for the subsidy scenarios and sensitivities are available 
at https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/ADVANCEWP3DB. The NDC data used in this paper 
are from ref. 29 and are available on request. The sources and compilation 
method for the input data on subsidies and prices are described in detail in 
Supplementary Methods subsection ‘Energy price and subsidy data’.
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